In this paper, we investigate the relationship between changes of efficiency, income inequality and life expectancy on the one hand and
garding pension systems two main strands developed. The first one investigates the negative correlation between the level of intragenerational redistribution and the size of the pension system (cf., e.g., Cremer and Pestieau, 1998; Casamatta et al., 2000a Casamatta et al., , 2000b Köthenbürger et al., 2007; Rossignol and Taugourdeau, 2006) ; the second one the sustainability of intragenerational redistribution in international systems competition (cf., e.g., Cremer and Pestieau, 2003; Kolmar, 2007; Poutvaara, 2007) . Further aspects have been dealt with, for example, in Poutvaara (2001, 2006) , Hougaard Jensen et al. (2004) or Krieger (2003) . Analogous discussions with respect to unemployment protection can be found, for example, in Goerke (2001) , Goerke and Madsen (2003) , Goerke et al. (2007) and Lingens and Wälde (2006) .
Our study considers pension systems in 20 OECD countries for the time period 1985 to 2000. In line with the studies mentioned above, we empirically observe an increase of the Bismarckian factor for most countries. Pension systems tend to move "back to Bismarck". We single out two factors that can be held responsible for this development: changes of the shape of the income distribution and an asymmetric increase of life expectancy. These findings are consistent with the most recent developments in the literature on intragenerational redistribution. In particular, Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) emphasize the decisive role of inequality for the level of redistribution. Borck (2007) and Gorski et al. (2007) show that a positive correlation between income and longevity dampens redistribution from rich to poor in pension systems.
We derive four main results: first, basic income support for the elderly is perceived as a weakly superior good, that is, the minimum pension grows at a less than proportional rate when society becomes richer. Second, the minimum pension is predominately considered as a relative concept aiming at equal societal participation rather than a means of absolute poverty alleviation. Therefore higher inequality in terms of the variance of the income distribution leads to a weaker redistribution preference. Third, as the skewness of the income distribution increases, relative deprivation becomes more apparent because the number of individuals with a below average income rises. Therefore, the median voter on behalf of the society demands more redistribution in favor of the poor. Fourth, an asymmetric increase of life expectancy in favor of the rich downsizes the importance of intragenerational redistribution.
Evidently, a larger dispersion of incomes and a positive correlation between income and individual life expectancy reduces the societal preference for intragenerational redistribution in the pension system by strengthening the earnings-related, that is the Bismarckian, component. In a sense, this means that society gears towards more efficiency. This development even exceeds the societal desire for a stronger flat, that is Beveridgean, component in order to guarantee the deprived parts of the population an acceptable minimum standard of living.
Our study shows that increasing income inequality (in terms of the variance of the income distribution) is not necessarily accompanied by a change in a society's degree of inequality aversion. In fact, what really matters is relative deprivation. The concept of relative deprivation traces back to Stouffer et al. (1949) and was advanced by Runciman (1966) and others. Generically, relative deprivation describes a subjectively perceived lack of something in relation to a societal reference value (e.g., a hot breakfast). The link between relative deprivation and a society's degree of inequality aversion was highlighted by the philosopher Temkin (1986 Temkin ( , 1993 who argued that inequality aversion was driven by the complaints of the poor about their situation in relation to that of the rich. Devooght (2003) found experimental support for Temkin's model. Seidl et al. (2006 ) used Parducci's (1965 , 1968 , 1974 , 1982 range-frequency theory in order to experimentally investigate the context dependence of the assessment of income distributions. They showed that a positively skewed income distribution (the normal case of the OECD countries) generates less relative deprivation at the individual level but more relative deprivation at the societal level than a negatively skewed income distribution (given the same mean income). This is due to the fact that in a positively skewed income distribution the poor are relatively close to the median income. However, in the positively skewed income distribution the number of the poor by far exceeds the number of the poor in a negatively skewed income distribution.
We test our causal hypotheses by means of a supplementary laboratory experiment. There exists already a large body of experimental literature concerned with classical problems of distributional economics like the acceptance of basic normative principles such as the transfer principle (cf., e.g., Cowell, 1992, 2000; Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo, 1993; Seidl, 1994a, 1994b; Bernasconi, 2002) or the derivation of social welfare functions from individual preferences (cf. Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1994; Traub et al., 2005; Traub et al., 2008) . Recent studies, predominately with a strong game theoretic context, took up the question whether individual distributional preferences are "self-regarding" or "other-regarding" (cf., e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003) . However, to our knowledge this is the first experimental study that analyzes distributional preferences in the context of social security systems and at the same time tests causal hypotheses about the relationship between the decision context (in terms of the shape of the income distribution and life expectancy) and distributional preferences.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we formally discuss the Bismarckian factor and present an empirical analysis based on LIS microdata for 20 OECD countries. We present our main hypotheses for the experiment in Section 3.
In Section 4, we turn to the economic laboratory experiment. Section 5 concludes.
Some Empirical Facts

Defining the Bismarckian factor
In order to derive a workable and intuitive representation of the level of intragenerational redistribution in a pension system as our dependent variable, we define the Bismarckian factor along the lines of the "index of noncontributiveness" (INC) (Lefèbvre and Pestieau, 2006; Lefèbvre 2007) . The INC, denoted by β, is defined as the ratio of the income share of public pensions in the bottom quintile, B, to the same share in the top quintile, T :
where Y i and P i , i ∈ {B, 2, 3, 4, T }, are the mean income and the mean pension benefit, respectively, of the ith quintile. A purely Beveridgean pension system which pays equal benefits to every citizen implies P B = P T , such
If benefits are solely earnings-related, the respective purely Bismarckian pension system yields P B /Y B = P T /Y T and, therefore,
INC is not normalized which is a bit unfavorable for cross-country comparisons.
We use the definition of the pension benefit of a representative member of quintile i in order to derive the Bismarckian factor. P i is defined as a convex combination of a flat payment (proportional to the mean income) and an earnings-related component (cf. Casamatta et al., 2000a) :
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the Bismarckian factor and µ ≡ i Y i /5 is the mean of the society's income distribution. A measure of the generosity of the pension system τ ∈ [0, 1] reflecting the replacement ratio 1 is given by
We plug equation (2) into the ratio of the pension benefits of the bottom and the top quintile P B /P T (the left fraction in the definition of INC). Solving this expression for α gives the Bismarckian factor
Bismarckian pension system (P B /Y B = P T /Y T ) gives α bis = 1. Hence, as desired the Bismarckian factor is normalized on the closed interval [0, 1].
2
Note that α is independent of the generosity τ of the pension system. This implies that α is not only a pure measure of intragenerational redistribution but also allows for cross-country comparisons of public pension systems of different size (at least for countries with equal µ).
The data
For the empirical analysis, we use microdata from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) in order to determine the variables µ, P B and P T which are needed for calculating the Bismarckian factor α according to equation (4).
Furthermore, we use the data for deriving the moments of the income distribution. The LIS is chosen because it provides internationally comparable and reliable data on income distributions (cf. Atkinson, 2004 
Results
In Figure 1 , the change of the Bismarckian factor is displayed for the 20
OECD countries under consideration. On the abscissa, we show the Bismarckian factor computed according to equation (4) t-statistic: 1.833; level of significance: p = 0.083).
- Figure With a positive correlation between longevity and income/contributions the present value of the flat benefit is higher for the rich. 6 In sum, our set of 5 This outcome resembles to some degree the "paradox of redistribution" by Korpi and Palme (1998) , which has empirically been supported in the context of pension systems by Lefèbvre (2007) . 6 Evidence for a positive effect of wealth on life expectancy has been provided, e.g., by Attanasio and Emerson (2003) or Deaton and Paxson (2001) . Even more in line with our independent variables includes the moments of the income distribution (as measures of mean income and inequality) as well as life expectancy. We also report further moments of the income distribution; here specifically in terms of the relative changes of the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) and of the skewness. Both coefficients reflect strong increases in inequality: the coefficient of variation increased by almost 12 percent, the skewness parameter by a bit less than 50 percent.
For completeness, we also consider the Gini coefficient which increased by 1.4 percentage points. 7 We do not make use of the Gini coefficient in the following, though, for reasons explained in more details below. Finally, the life expectancy of persons at the age of 65 years increased by approximately 1.5 month per year. Table 2 presents the results of an OLS estimation for the LIS data. The relative change of the Bismarckian factor (between the first and the last LIS wave available for the respective country) entered the regression as the endogenous variable. We use the mean, the coefficient of variation and the skewness of the income distribution as well as the change of life expectancy as explanatory variables.
argument is the finding that the positive effect of income on life expectancy can make a pension system regressive (cf., e.g., Coronado et al., 2000; Gil and Lopez-Casanovas, 1998; Reil-Held, 2000 [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] We find that the change of the mean of equivalent disposable net household income has no significant effect on the Bismarckian factor. The change of the coefficient of variation has a (weakly) significant positive sign (at a 10 percent level of significance). The skewness of the income distribution has a significantly negative impact on the degree of redistribution in the pension system. From Table 1 influences. Based on a substantially larger number of observations, an experiment can confirm -or possibly reject -our findings from the microdata analysis.
Hypotheses
Given our insights from our microdata analysis, in a first step we will derive testable hypotheses for the causal relations between, on the one hand, the shape of the income distribution as well as life expectancy and, on the other hand, the Bismarckian factor as a measure of intragenerational redistribution.
Turning first to the potential impact of mean income (or efficiency, respectively) we consider Boulding's (1962, S. 83) 
A priori, it is unclear whether and how equity preferences change when economic efficiency in terms of the society's mean income improves. For given generosity of the pension system and Bismarckian factor, the income elasticity of the minimum pension according to equation (5) is equal to one. If the minimum pension is considered as a superior good and the elasticity is greater than one (smaller than one), the Bismarckian factor must decrease (increase), given the generosity of the pension system.
Here, we argue that from a developed society's perspective a minimum pension has both an absolute element in terms of Boulding's hypothesis and a relative element in terms of relative deprivation. It has a floor because a developed society can ill afford absolute poverty; it has a ceiling since societal standards grow jointly with growing wealth. If the society attaches relatively little value to individual effort and success, the minimum pension will be close to the ceiling or else to the floor. Hence, our first working hypothesis assumes that the minimum pension is a weakly superior good.
Hypothesis 1: A higher mean of the income distribution leads to a higher Bismarckian factor (to less intragenerational redistribution in the pension system), that is, from a society's perspective a minimum pension is a weakly superior good.
Consider now our estimates from LIS microdata presented in Section 2.
Here and in contrast to Hypothesis 1, the change of the mean of equivalent disposable net household income has no significant effect on the Bismarckian factor. However, since the mean has increased significantly according to Table 1 the flat component c must have increased almost proportional to the mean µ. Hence, we can conclude that the minimum pension an be considered as a superior good with an income elasticity close to one. The negative sign suggests that the elasticity may even be slightly higher than one. However, we will later see a slightly different result in our laboratory experiment.
Next, we consider changes of inequality in our analysis (cf. Conde-Ruiz and Profeta, 2007) . Note that the change of the Gini coefficient, as a standard inequality measure, is a combined effect of changes of the variance and the skewness of the income distribution. On the one hand, due to the transfer principle, an increase in the variance of the income distribution increases the Gini coefficient. On the other hand, if the skewness of the income distribution increases, the Gini coefficient decreases. Since our experimental design allows to explicitly distinguish the effects and, thus, provides additional valuable information, we consider -instead of the Gini coefficient -variance and skewness of the income distribution separately in our hypotheses.
Only at a first glance, the effect of a larger variance appears obvious. With a larger variance of the income distribution the risk increases of being later on as a pensioner reliant on income transfers in order to make ends meet. Hence, decreasing the Bismackian factor may be considered as a reasonable strategy.
However, the variance effect is more complex and has to be related to our arguments and findings regarding the income elasticity of minimum pensions:
in developed OECD countries basic income support is more a relative than an absolute concept. In other words: income support is given in order to allow the poor to participate in society's activities (although usually at a lower level), and less so a means of avoiding poverty in the sense of famine, malnutrition or homelessness. Therefore, the height of Boulding's "modest gives the poor a strong incentive for additional personal efforts to improve their own situation already during worklife.
Hypothesis 2: A higher variance of the income distribution leads to a higher Bismarckian factor (to less intragenerational redistribution in the pension system).
If, on the other hand, the skewness of the income distribution increases, the level of relative deprivation perceived by the society increases with respect to the pensioners, too. Hence, people might be interested in a higher "modest table".
Hypothesis 3: A more positively skewed income distribution leads to a lower Bismarckian factor (to more intragenerational redistribution in the pension system).
Our microdata analysis shows that the change of the coefficient of variation has in fact a (weakly) significant positive sign. Therefore, the LIS data supports our working hypothesis 2: if the income distribution becomes less equal due to a larger variance of incomes, the Bismarckian factor increases and intragenerational redistribution is reduced. The skewness of the income distribution has a significantly negative impact on the degree of redistribution in the pension. From Table 1 Table 1 ). On the other hand, there exist substantial differences between life expectancy among different groups in society. In particular, there is a negative correlation between social status and mortality risk (see, e.g., the references in Footnote 6).
From an economic perspective, increasing life expectancy at a given retirement age implies a higher risk of being poor and having to rely on state transfers during retirement. The pension system covers the income risks involved with unknown life expectancy. If life expectancy increases across the board, that is, symmetrically, the generosity of the pension system τ has to increase in order to guarantee the same replacement income as before. For a given generosity of the pension system, however, there is no reason for the median voter on behalf of society to change the degree of intragenerational redistribution and, thus, the income distribution. A first hypothesis regarding life expectancy can be stated as follows:
Hypothesis 4a: A symmetric increase of general life ex-pectancy (a lower mortality risk), that is, the extent of the rise is equal in all income classes, has no impact on the Bismarckian factor (the level of intragenerational redistribution).
Empirically, however, a positive correlation between income and life expectancy can be observed. To work out our argument, let us assume that life expectancy of the average citizen remains unchanged and that life expectancy of the rich (poor) increases (decreases). On the one hand, this implies an increase of the pension system's generosity because the rich receive higher benefits than the poor. On the other hand, this effect is more than compensated by a risk-neutral "social planner" who realizes that the expected value of pension benefits of the rich (poor) has increased (fallen). From the society's perspective it is relatively more profitable to "invest" into the rich citizens' pensions. This is consistent with a Harsanyi-Friedman type social welfare function. Technically, the flat component will be reduced and/or the earnings-related component will be increased, such that we have an increase of α and a reduction of intragenerational redistribution. Although from a different angle, this is similar to the life expectancy effect in Borck (2007) and Gorski et al. (2007) .
Hypothesis 4b: If life expectancy changes asymmetrically, that is, it falls for the bottom and it rises for the top income class, this will increase the Bismarckian factor (and reduce the preference for intragenerational redistribution).
In our experiment the generosity of the pension system is given. 8 We explicitly distinguish between a symmetric and an asymmetric increase of life 8 Since in the experiment only a one-period decision on redistribution is made, there is expectancy. In fact, this change is included by using mortality risk. If the risk of not entering retirement (e.g., due to early death) is reduced, life expectancy increases in the sense of receiving a pension benefit with a greater probability. In the symmetric case the probability of receiving a benefit increases equally across the board; in the asymmetric case the probability in the top income class rises while it falls in the bottom income class. A symmetric increase in life expectancy increases the expected value of the benefit equally for every individual. This means that the parameters of the pension system do not change. Because the generosity is exogenously fixed, the Bismarckian factor remains unchanged as well. An asymmetric increase leads to the previously discussed effect that the expected value of the pension benefits of the rich increases in comparison to the poor's. Because of this the earningsrelated factor increases and the minimum pension decreases (in order to keep generosity constant).
The LIS microdata, which is collected from living persons only, cannot be related to the length of life. Therefore, a priori it is not clear which of the two counteracting effects dominates dominates, that is, whether the Bismarckian factor will rise or fall when both effects have to be considered simultaneously because the data does not allow separating them. The relative importance of the two effects can be seen from the sign of the coefficient estimate which turns out to be positive (see Table 1 ). Hence, empirically we observe an increase of the Bismarckian factor when life expectancy increases. Apparantly, the life expectancy effect more than compensated the redistribution effect.
no need to choose between today's and future consumption. An endogenous determination of the generosity of the pension system is therefore not necessary.
Although our data does not allow to determine the strength of the correlation between life expectancy and income, our observations thus strongly support a substantial positive effect of these variables and a strong tendency of the social planner to value efficiency considerations.
In the following section we will complement our microdata analysis by testing our hypotheses by an laboratory experiment on preferences for redistribution.
The Experiment 4.1 Experimental design
The experiment was fully computerized. It consisted of two parts. In the first part, the subjects were presented the decision task. In the second part, we collected their sociodemographics and attitudes. Each subject had only one decision problem to solve. Figure 2 presents a sample screen of the decision problem. There were five columns on the screen. Under each column the number of "winning points" was displayed, corresponding to the height of the column. The subjects were told that the points resemble "Mr./Mrs. A to E's" claims against some (non-specific) social insurance system. Below the winning points, the row labeled "Euro" gave the information how the winning points would be exchanged for money at the end of the experiment. This payoff should be interpreted as the actual pension benefit after redistribution.
- Figure 2 about here -By using the control on the lower part of the screen, the participants could choose the degree of redistribution of (pension) claims of five hypothetical persons, ranging from zero to 100 percent. Initially, the control was set at zero; this is equivalent to a Bismarckian factor of one, that is, there is a perfectly proportional relation between winning points and payoffs. By turning the control to the right, the share of winning points which are redistributed among individuals increases to up to 100 percent, implying a Bismarckian factor of zero, that is, a pure Beveridgean pension system. The redistribution of winning points was highlighted by spotted areas within the columns.
The participants were asked to choose the distribution of payoffs they "liked best" by setting the control appropriately. Thereby the following payoff rules had to be taken into account: at the end of the experiment two groups, each including five subjects, were randomly picked. Each of the selected subjects was randomly assigned to an income position in its group (denoted by "Mr./Mrs. A to E") and given the respective cash payment. The payment resulted from the income position and the median α of the group. That is, the Bismarckian factor of each small society was determined by majority vote from the five individual values set by the control. This simple incentive structure is preference-revealing. Strategic considerations, such as coalition building, could not play a role for the subjects' decisions due to anonymous data collection and randomized sampling of groups.
A three-factorial experimental design was chosen to test our hypotheses.
There were (2x3x3=) 18 treatments. We varied -the factor at which winning points are exchanged into cash payments in order to test for the effects of increasing efficiency or national product, respectively; {low, high} -the inequality of the distribution of winning points with respect to variance and skewness in order to test the effect of increasing income inequality;
{low variance and symmetric income distribution, high variance and symmetric income distribution, low variance and positively skewed income distribution} -the risk of not receiving a payment (benefit) in order to test for the life expectancy effect. {no risk, symmetric risk, risk negatively correlated with number of winning points}
The "no-risk" scenario is conducted according to the previously described rules. In the case of symmetric risk one out of five subjects did not receive a payment. When risk is negatively correlated with income the probability of not receiving a benefit was -as before -on average 20 percent; however, the individual probability was calculated according to the formula
j=1 j , where i is the rank in a descending ordering of the distribution of winning points. In Figure 2 , this scenario is indicated by the "Risiko" (risk) row.
9 A complete list of all treatments and the chosen parameters is given in Table 3 .
After the decision task a standardized questionnaire had to be answered by the subjects. In the questionnaire we asked for the field of study (ordered by schools) as well as some knowledge and attitude questions, which will be explained in detail in Section 4.3. Furthermore, at the beginning of the experiment subjects had to indicate their sex.
Survival probability
No Symmetric Correlated 
Procedure
The experiment took place in the cafeteria of the University of Bremen on June 2nd and 3rd, 2007. Interested students were informed about a scientific study on social insurances. Furthermore, they were told that a shop-up fee of 5 Euros was to be paid, that participation would take about 10 minutes and that there was a chance of winning up to 1050 Euros. The subjects drew a lot with a five-digit number. The first three digits determined the treatment (according to Table 3 , the fourth and fifth digit gave the group number within a treatment and the individual income position within the group, respectively. However, the subjects were not given any information about the meaning of the number, which was -together with the sex -the initial input necessary to start the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, that is, after answering the questionnaire, a lottery started. The ten lot numbers of the winning groups were selected by an umpire before the experiment and saved on the computers. Whenever the lot number of the subject coincided with a predetermined number, the subject was informed that he or she is a winner. In case of a risk scenario the winning subjects were reminded that -due to a second lottery -there may not be a payment despite being a winner. After collecting all data, the median of the control values (or individual preferences for redistribution, respectively) of all five group member was determined. Based on this median value, the individual payments were calculated. All subjects participating in the experiment received -independent of whether being a winner or notthe show-up fee. Per treatment two groups of five subjects each took part.
Hence, in total 180 students participated in the experiment. Show-up fees summed up to 900 Euros. The ten winners received a total of 3,379 Euros, although one subject in a risk-treatment did not receive a payment.
Results
On average, the individually preferred Bismarckian factor α of all subjects was 0.61. There was no significant difference (t-test: p = 0.334) between men (61 percent of the sample, α = 0.60) and women (39%, α = 0.63). There was a strong correlation between the average individual Bismarckian factor chosen by the subjects and the expected average α of the other subjects, which also had a value of 0.61 (Pearson correlation: ρ = 0.441, p < 0.01).
The correlation with the level of general basic income support, considered as necessary for Germany by the subjects (mean: 643 Euros, standard deviation:
247 Euros), and α was as expected negative but insignificant (ρ = −0.028, p = 0.711). Between schools there were no significant differences (F -test: p = 0.303) although some schools had a tendency for a below-average α (social sciences: 0.53, education: 0.50) or above-average α (production engineering: 0.69).
Because in the beginning the subjects were only told that the experiment deals with some not-specified social insurance system, we asked what exactly subjects thinks is the social insurance mainly. The results were mixed: 29% thought of the pension insurance (0.60) followed by health insurance (26%, 0.62), unemployment insurance (18%, 0.61). long-term insurance (6%, 0.66) and accident insurance (4%, 0.54). Only few subjects chose systems which -in a narrow sense -are not related to social insurance, such as social aid (11%, 0.65) or "other" (6%, 0.48). There were no significant differences between answer groups with respect to the Bismarckian factor (F -test, p = 0.301).
Neither was there a significant difference (F -test, p = 0.921) between the answers on the question whether responsibility for old-age provision should be private (8%, 0.62), public (14%, 0.62) or jointly (78%, 0.60). The same insignificance (F -test, p = 0.437) can be found for the self-assessment regarding risk attitude with the categories risk-averse (50%, 0.62), risk-neutral (32%, 0.58) and risk-loving (18%, 0.62). On average, the subjects estimated the employees' share in social insurance contributions in Germany to be 24 percent. Again, there was no significant correlation with the Bismarckian factor (ρ = −0.106, p = 0.158), although there was a slight tendency that subjects who estimated a high share preferred more redistribution.
The descriptive results presented so far are neither representative for the entire population nor is it permissible to refer to the absolute level of the Bismarckian factor. In fact, homogeneity of the random sample allows comparing the different treatments. Any differences in the preferred level of redistribution result exclusively from the exogenous variation of the stimuli.
Whenever individuals respond to monetary incentives, these treatment effects in the laboratory turn out to be evidence for analogous effects of changes of the income distribution and life expectancy in the real-world.
Because the public pension system and thus the level of intragenerational redistribution within the pension system are based on democratic majority votes, we do not use individual α's but -in line with the incentive structure of the experiment -the median α of different groups. Note that individual decisions regarding the Bismarckian factor were made behind Rawls' "veil of ignorance". This implies that subjects were assigned their position in society only at the end of the experiment. This guarantees that subjects take on a neutral position and choose only societally beneficial levels of economic inequality (Rawls, 1971) . Furthermore, in reality there exists a substantial degree of uncertainty about one's own future economic situation. Another advantage of the "veil of ignorance" is that subjects had no information about their fellow group members. This anonymity allows to construct from the ten group members of each of the 18 treatments a total of 252 groups by permutation. From this follows that we had 4,536 independent observations of homogenous groups in our regression analysis. Table 4 shows the results of a simple OLS regression in which the preferred level of intragenerational redistribution (from the society's perspective) is the endogenous variable. Exogenous variables were mean, coefficient of variation and skewness of the income distribution as well as life expectancy. While the regression explains only a small part of total variation (in experiments the noise is usually quite large), it is nevertheless highly significant.
The average Bismarckian factor (in percent) is about 58 percent in our benchmark scenario with a low mean, low variance and symmetric distribution as well as symmetrically distributed low life expectancy. Increasing the exchange rate of payments for winning points (that is, moving to a "high mean" scenario) raises the Bismarckian factor significantly by approximately 3.6 percentage points. In the "high mean" scenario the generosity of the pension system is three times higher than in the benchmark scenario. When we changed life expectancy asymmetrically (that is, life expectancy of the rich increased and of the poor decreased), this had the expected effect of a higher α by 2.1 percentage points.
Conclusions
Our analysis aimed at providing fundamental insights into factors determining societal preferences for intragenerational redistribution in public social insurance systems, in particular the first pillar of the public pension system. We proceeded by applying different analytical steps, including a crosscountry estimate based on microdata from the Luxembourg Income Study and a laboratory experiment. As a general result we find that exogenous variations of both the shape of the income distribution and life expectancy had a substantial effect on preferences for redistribution. These preferences were measured by applying the Bismarckian factor which -hypotheticallydivides the pension benefit into a flat and an earnings-related component.
In a first step, we showed that there is at least weak evidence for a reduction of intragenerational redistribution in public pension systems, as suggest (but not yet empirically confirmed) in the recent literature. In the majority of OECD countries, for which data is available, the level of intragenerational redistribution has been reduced. In order to explain this development we derived and tested several hypothesis about the level of redistribution in pension system, using analogous variables for the microdata analysis and the experiment. Compared to the microdata analysis, the laboratory ex-periment has the advantage of effectively varying the exogenous explanatory variables while at the same time excluding any other influences. Only this allows to determine causal relations. Furthermore, the experiment was based on approximately 4,500 independent variables while the number countries observations is naturally limited.
Our analysis shows that basic income support in the pension system, that is, minimum pensions, are superior with respect to an increasing national product of an economy. While the LIS microdata analysis indicates an almost proportional increase in the minimum pension relative to the economy's mean income level, the experiment -by purposely exaggerating the raise of income -shows only weak superiority, that is, an income elasticity of minimum pensions below one. As the experiment excludes any repercussions between pension system and income distribution we conclude that basic income support is weakly superior if a pure change of the mean of the income distribution, as considered in hypothesis 1, is considered.
The Boulding hypothesis suggests that there exists a societal preference for an earnings-relationship of pension benefits which is limited towards the bottom line by a flat benefit for everybody ("modest table"). The weak superiority of income support implies that basic income support in the pension system has both an absolute streak (lower bound) and a relative streak in the sense of participation is society's activities. In other words: in an increasingly wealthy society the relative importance of basic income support (relative to the earnings-related component) falls; however, it is not reduced in absolute terms.
Closely connected to this finding is a second important result which is related to the consequences of increasing income inequality. Here, increasing inequality implies both a greater variation and a more positive skewness. At a first glance, one would expect that both developments will reduce the level of intragenerational redistribution. However, for the variance (which tends to aggravate old-age poverty) the argument is more subtile. In fact, we expected an increasing Bismarckian factor because of a relative rather than absolute Taking fundamental societal developments -in particular demographic change and globalization -into consideration our results yield two major insights. The ageing of societies has obviously the effect that the importance of earnings-related components in the public pension system are strengthened. This is even more the case when life expectancy changes asymmetrically in favor of the rich. Globalization will -if it leads to a higher economic wealth across-the-board -reduce the importance of intragenerational redistribution.
This, however, presumes that the process of globalization does not lead to a more positively skewed income distribution -for example by a reduced labor share in national income -which would induce stronger relative deprivation and thus the wish for additional intragenerational redistribution in the pension system. • Relative change of the mean of the income distribution. This variable and the following were taken from the LIS or calculated on basis of LIS data, respectively. We chose the first and last available data set.
We used equivalent and weighted (if weighting variables were available)
household net income data 10 in order to calculate mean, coefficient of variation and skewness of the income distribution as well as the Gini coefficient.
• Relative change of the coefficient of variation. See above.
• Relative change of the skewness of the income distribution. See above.
• Absolute change of the Bismarckian factor. See Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
Note that for Norway a comparable method of data aggregation for 
